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Abstract-- In the area of SOA and Web Service Security, 
many well defined security dimensions have been 
established. However, current Web Security Systems 
(WS-Security for example) are not equipped to handle 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. In this paper 
we extend upon our previous wori{ on, Service Oriented 
Traceback Architecture (SOTA), in order to defend Web 
Services against such attacks. SOTA's main objective is to 
identify the true identity of forged messages, since an 
attacker tries to hide their identity, in which to avoid 
current defence systems and escape prosecution. To 
accomplish the main objective, SOTA should be attached as 
close to the source of the attack. When an incoming SOAP 
message comes into the router, it is tagged with our own 
SOAP header. The header can be used to traverse the 
network back to the true source of the attack. According to 
our experimental evaluations we find that SOTA is simple 
and effective to use against DDoS attacks. 
Index Terms-- Traceback, Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA), Service-Oriented Computing (SOC), Distributed Denial of 
Service. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent events, a group called anonymous used a Distributed 
Denial of Service attack, to bring down a prominent website 
[30]. This attack is another example of the serious threat that 
DDoS poses to information infrastructures 16][7]. The main 
objective of a DDoS attack is to attempt to exhaust computer 
resources (CPU time, Network bandwidth etc) 18][9]. Another 
objective of DDoS, is for the attackers to hide their ident.ity by 
mimicking a legitimate web service [10][ 131. Organizations, 
through the use of Web Services, expose their core elements 
over the Internet, via the use of Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) in conjunction with HTTP and SMTP. With this 
exposure, organizations open themselves up to those who have a 
malicious intent. 
Current security for web services encompasses the areas of 
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integrity, confidentiality and availability 11]12]. WS-Security 
[3], XML-Signature 114], XML-Encryption [15] employ these 
areas. These standards work in conjunction with Simple Object 
Access Protocol (SOAP) [5]. From these developments, a new 
standard for Web Security has emerged, called Security 
Assertions Markup Language (SAML) 116][18]. The major 
problem of these security standards is the focus on protecting 
message content, anci not on the message itself [4]. The paper by 
Jenson et. al. [I] discusses the depth of this problem. 
Our contribution in this paper is to expand upon our 
previous research [28], in adopting a product-neutral approach, 
called Service Oriented Traceback Architecture (SOTA). 
SOT A can be used to prevent DDoS and XDoS (XML based 
DoS) attacks on Web services. Current Web Security Services 
show, that new enhancements are needed against the current 
flow of attacks. SOTA provides the resources to traceback 
through the network, so that the true source of DDoS attack is 
identified. Upon the discovery of the identity of an attacker, the 
appropriate preventive mechanisms can be triggered, like using 
firewalls to filter out attack messages. The remainder of the 
paper is made up of the following: Section 2 reviews the related 
work on Web Security Services. Section 3 covers the details of 
our SOT A framework. Section 4 presents our experiments and 
performance evaluation. Lastly, Section 5 provides our 
conclusions 
II. PRCEDURE FOR PAPER SUBMISSION 
Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) ulilises services as the 
cornerstone for developing Web Applicacion solutions. With 
DDoS attacks occurring on a daily basis II I] [12][ 19], attackers 
have discovered how easy it is to disrupt web services. In this 
section we briefly discuss two defense systems that have been 
developed to handle Web Based DDoS attacks, and their 
problems in dealing with DDoS. 
A. Current Web Service thIellse Svstellls 
Ye et al. [27] proposed a SOA approach to handle DDoS 
attacks. Their Service Hub is built upon Web Services and 
placed in between the client and the service provider. It contains 
two modes, a normal and an attack mode. The messages go 
through to the service provider in normal mode. In attack mode, 
the Service Hub authenticates messages, authorizes it and 
passes it onto the service provider. The main problem with this 
system is that it is incapable of handling a reflective attack [20]. 
The second problem with the Ye's system is that authenticator 
can be spoofed with a forged legitimate user id. The 
Padmanabhuni et. al. [I7) framework is another Web Security 
System. Its main task is to detect and filter out XDoS attacks 
against web services. Their framework focuses on validating 
XML, in order to authenticate legitimate users. An XML 
message, with the forged id of a legitimate user, can be used to 
get around this defence. 
Ill. SOTA FRAMEWORK 
A. SOTA Description 
In our previous paper 128], we cover SOTA in-depth, so in 
this section we briefly cover our model. SOTA is a web security 
service application that is product-neutral. Its main objective is 
to apply a SOA approach to traceback methodology, in order to 
identify a forged message id, since one of the main objectives of 
DDoS is hide the attacker's true identity. Figure one displays 
where SOTA is located within the network. The basis of SOT A 
is founded upon the Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM) [231 
algorithm. DPM marks the ID field and rcserved flag within the 
IP header. As each incoming packet enters the edge ingress 
router it is marked. The marked packets will remain unchanged 
as they traverse the network. Outgoing packets are ignored. 
DPM methodology is applied to our SOTA framework, by 
placing the Service-Oriented Traceback Mark (SOTM) within 
web service messages. If any other web security services 
(WS-Security for example) are already being employed, SOTM 
would replace the 'token' that contains the client identification. 
Real source message identification are stored within SOTM, 
and placed inside the SOAP message. SOTM, as in DPM tag, 
will not change as it traverses through the network. The 
composition of SOTM is made up of one XML tag, so not to 
weigh down the message, and stored within a SOAP header. 
Upon discovery of a DDoS attack, SOTM can be used to 
identify the true source of forged messages. 
SOTA does not directly eliminate a DDoS attack message; 
this is left for the filter section of a defense system (Firewalls). 
Instead SOT A main goal is to deal with one of the two main 
objectives ofDDoS, which is the forging the id. Spoofing an lD 
is done for two reason, these are: exploit a known vulnerability, 
in order to bring down system. These vulnerabilities could be 
found in communication channels (flooding for example) 
,,,"~. ".. ".",~., .... '"~''.''' "".':eo"., 
~~~"r 
Service Provld(!r (::~OTA !ecom,truction) 
Figure 1. SOT A from the network service prospective 
or known exploits within the services provided (for example, an 
attacker can Overload their messages, which will result in the 
web server crashing). The second reason is that attackers try to 
hide their identity. The reasons vary for this second reason, 
which depends on what type of attack, but usually it is to cover 
their crime or to bypass a known defense that is in place to 
prevent it. It is with this second objective that SOTA attempts to 
cover, as other traceback methods, like Probability Packet 
Marking (PPM) [2 I ][22] and DPM. 
There are many reasons for to employ a SOT A type 
framework, these are: 
.. Current web security is not up to handling an XDoS or 
DXDoS attack. In fact, as Jension et al. shows how 
WS-Security can be used in an XDoS attack. 
.. With IPv6 coming into fruition [29], current IP traceback 
methods will no longer be viable. This is due to the 
changes that IPv6 introduces, such as, IPSec and the 
packet header format no longer holds support the fields 
that are required for IP traceback. 
.. SOTA does not violate IP protocols, in order to store 
information for traceback purposes. 
Using the SOA model, SOTA can be employed on any 
ubiquitous grid system. 
B. SOTA approach to SOA 
SOA organizes the infrastructure into a set of interacting 
services for SOc. There are a number of basic properties and 
services [24] contained in SOT A. These characteristics are as 
follows [25]: 
.. Loosely Coupled - SOTA is made from the XML base 
language. This means that it can be run on different 
platforms, regardless of the programming language. 
.. Message based interaction - The interaction between the 
client, SOT A. and service provider are all message based. 
@ Dynamic Discovery - WSDL is attached to SOTA so that 
all services are known to the public. This means that any 
client can connect to SOT A at any time over the internet. 
.. Late Binding - SOTA and the service provider all run in 
real-time. This allows clients to access services anytime. 
.. Policy based behavior - SOTA aligns itself with 
WS-Security Policy. It also implements its own policy 
called SOTA-Policy. This policy dictates what messages 
are marked. 
IV. Performance Evaluation 
A. Simulation Setup 
Experiments were carried out to evaluate the pelfOlmance of 
the SOTA system. These experiments were performed on a Dell 
Dimension DM501 Intel Pentium single-core CPU, 3.0 GHz, 2 
GB of RAM and 2300GB SAT A hard-drives. All our programs 
were implemented with .NET Web Services with the use of 
VB.Net. Figures 2 and 3 display the algorithms used to insert 
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I SOTM procedure at SOTA, edgel~t~-;fac;1 
I 
I 
For each incoming request message VI 
If no header then 
create SoapHeaderAttribute("client id") 
Invoke Header new SoapHeaderAttribute 
Else 
get WSSusernameToken(xx) 
WSSusername = new client id 
Figure 2. Pseudo Code to extract Header information 
~-------.--------.------------.-.-----.----.----- -_ .. ---- --~--, 
Identification reconstruction procedure at web server 
For each message request w from source Sx 
Create a table array 
Ws.tx = extract TransactioninfoO 
Ws.tx.time_and_date = timestamp 
Ws.tx.usernameld = usernamelD I 
Table_array[J+ = Ws.txusernamelD I 
End 
Display of username at particular time of the attack I 
For each Table_arraY[J 
Get what time of attack 
Get usernamelD from Table_array[J 
I Display usernamelD 
- -.------..... -.~-----------
Figure 3. Pseudo Code to extract, store and display username 
identification 
and extract the SOTM tag. 
The experiments we conducted were broken up into two 
groups. The first group of experiments compared SOT A against 
SOAP authentication and WS-Security. The second group of 
expetiments simulated XDoS attacks against the service 
provider. We selected to simulate the oversize payload, 
SOAP Action spoofing and XML injection from the Jenson et. al 
[1 1 paper. 
B. Assumptions used for our experiments 
The following assumptions made about our first group of 
experiments are that: 
e An attacker may control any number of client 
machines that are widely distributed across the 
Internet. 
e Attackers might know that they are being traced. 
e It only takes a few messages to get to the SOT A 
reconstruction for a traceback to begin. 
• SOTA has not itself been compromised by the 
attackers. 
• That the service provider of web service has limited 
resources. 
• SOAP headers are being used by the client. 
• Real Source ID is the location of the edge router. 
With the second group of experiments we decided to simulate 
three XDoS attacks. The reason for the simulations is due to the 
legality of implementing such attacks. For simulating message 
passing, we generated 20 messages within our code. 5 of these 
messages were selected randomly to represent the attack. To 
simulate the success of one attack, we introduced a 50/50 
chance that the message might crash the web-service. If the web 
server did not crash, the service provider was able to trace the 
message source and initiate filtering procedures. However, if 
the attack was successful no more messages will be generated. 
Upon the web server crash, we assume ,he service provider 
would restart it. Upon the restart, the service provider would 
access SOT A reconstruction, find the source of the attack and 
filter the messages out. 
C. Evaluations ()lfhefirst group ojexperil7lents 
In our first experiment we developed a basic SOAP Web 
Service using .Net and VB.Net. The program contained a basic 
header for authentication purposes. To simulate SOTA, the 
program extracted the name id from the header and replaced 
with the real user id (010101). Jt is asslimed that a one-way 
transmission delay between client and Web Server is I Oms. The 
delay is simulated by the progralll going into a wait mode for 
10secs, and is added to the response time data. The 
measurements we used in this experiment were the processing 
time over the response time. The result shown in figure 4, was 
that over a 2 seconds of processing time, SOT A was far more 
effective then the SOAP authentication procedure. One of the 
reasons for this is because of a quicker response time, due to 
SOT A swapping the tag. Having the extra response time will 
lead to a reduction of computer resources during a DDoS or 
XDoS attack. 
In our second experiment, we rail a WS-Security interaction 
application agaim,t Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon 
EC2) 126]. The WS-Security application contained a signed 
certificate for authentication purposes. SOTA, in this 
experiment, was to exchange the username id for the 
authentication name. This was done before it was sent to the 
Amazon SOAP service, to ensure that the message would be 
received and that we got a response. The results are based on 
how long the application had taken to process a response from 
Amazon. SOT A was used in conjullction v\·ith WS-Security, in 
250 
~ 200 
~ 150 ~-~ Authenication i 100 
cf 50 
....... SOTA 
,,0 ,,() 0() '\() 0;0 ,,0 
Processing Time (ms) 
Figure 4. Results of SOAP Authentication and SOTA 
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~ 100 ~"",,,,-"'-,w"'SOTA(WS-
& 50 Secu~t0 
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Figure 5. Results of WS-Secllrity, SOTA(exchange) and 
SOTA(WS-Security} 
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Figure 6. Event Descriptor Graph for Oversize payload attack 
(Client attack message (A), SOTM tag (8), True identity of the 
message, requested by the service provider (C). 
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Figure 7. Messages generated by our first simulation 
(Oversize Payload). 
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Figure 8. 5 attack messages, out of the 20 generated, were 
removed after traceback and filter protocols (Overaize 
Payload Attack). 
order to replace the name id for the real-source id. The results 
show in figure 5, b:; introducing SOT A into WS-Security, an 
increase in response time was up by thirty percent. This increase 
means that during a DDoS attack, more processing time is 
required to handle the extra burden. The benefits of taking on 
this extra burden are: the true identification maybe found and 
additional integrity is applied to the message. 
Also in figure 5, we see a comparison between WS-Security 
and SOT A (exchange). According to the results, WS-Security is 
over twice the response time, shown in figure 9. The reason for 
the increase was due to WS-Security having to build a security 
token. This token was placed in tbe message before it was sent 
to the Amazon Web Server. Upon the receipt of the token, 
Amazon tested the authentication of the message. However, in 
comparison, SOT A only has to exchange the identification 
information. Assuming Amazon had SOT A on their system. 
Traceback to the source of attack could occur instead of just 
authenticating the message. 
D. Evaluations of the Second group of experiments 
The second group of experiments consists of implementing 
three XDoS attacks. The first of these is the oversize payload 
attack. Its objecti ve is to exhaust web service resources. 
Following Jenson eL al [II in the constrllction of this attack, 
A B c 
Figure 9. Event Descriptor Graph for SOAPaction attack 
(Spoofed SOAPAction message (A), SOTM tag (8), True 
identity of the message, requested by the service provider 
(C). 
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Figure 10. Messages generated by our first simulation 
(SOAPAction attack) 
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Processing Time (ms) 
30 
Figure 11. 5 attack messages, out of the 20 generated, were 
removed after traceback and filter protocols (SOAPAction 
attack). 
we developed an oversize payload message (see Figure 6a). 
Figure 7 displays the messages that our simulation generated. 
As each message passed through SOTA it was marked with a 
SOTM tag (see figure 6b). Further, we can see from figure 7 that 
the messages stop at Msg8, this means that an attack was 
successfuL The service provider, in the light of a sllccessful 
attack would initiate the following procedures: Restart the 
system, search SOT A reconstruction for the true source of the 
attack (see figure 6c), and instigate filtering protocols (See 
figure 8). To simulate these procedures, we restarted the 
program to generate 20 more messages. With the traceback and 
filtering controls in place, we found 5 attacks and IS normal 
messages (figure 8). 
The next simulation was a spoofed SOAPaction attack. It 
invokes an operation that is different within the SOAP body, 
and usually results in a web server crash. Figure 9a displays our 
spoofed SOAP Action message used in this simulation. The 
message contains within the SOAPAction the author'S first 
name, but only the author's last name is within the SOAP body. 
This message composition could result in the server behaving 
erratically or crashing it. Figure 10 displays the messages that 
our simulation generated. As each message passed through 
SOTA it was marked with a SOTM tag (see figure 9b). Further, 
we can see from figure 14 that the message stops at msg3, this 
means that an attack was successful. The service 
382 
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Figure 12. Event Descriptor Graph for XML injection sttack 
(Spoofed XML message (A), SOTM tag (8), True identity of 
the message, requested by the service provider (C). 
10 20 
Processing Time (ms) 
30 
Figure 13. 4 attack messages, out of the 20 generated, were 
removed after traceback and filter protocols (XML Injection 
attack). 
ProcessJngTimo(ms) 
Figure 14. 84 normal messages were processed. 9 floods 
were successful in crashing the system. 7 attacks message 
were filtered. 
provider will instigate the following procedures: Restart the 
system, search SOT A reconstruction for the true source of the 
attack (see figure 9c), and instigate filtering protocols (See 
figure I I). To simulate these procedures, we restarted the 
program to generate 20 more messages. With the traceback and 
filtering controls in place, we found 5 attack and IS normal 
messages (figure II). 
An XML Injection attack was our last simulation of the 3 
XDoS chosen. This attack tries to modify the XML structure of 
our SOAP message. Figure 12a shows that the authorname tag 
has another tag within it called authorlastname. The result of 
this message could lead to a server crash, though it is unlikely. 
Instead, as shown in figure 12a, the content has been changed. 
This content change, would lead to incorrect information, being 
displayed from the tag. Figure 13 displays the messages that our 
simulation generated. As each message passed through SOT A it 
was marked with a SOTM tag (Figure 12b). The result of the 
XML injection attack, shown in Figure 13. is that 4 attack 
messages were filtered. The first attack message signaled the 
service provider to instigate SOT A reconstruction. With the 
discovery of the attacker id, the service provider was able to 
filter out the rest of the attack messages. 
The final simulation we conducted was a message flood 
attack, using XML Injection. The simulation program was setup 
to generate a total of 100 messages. If one of those messages 
was an attack, it had 50/50 chance to crash the system. If the 
system did crash, a number between 100 and 300 ms was added 
to the next lot of response time. This was to simulate the time 
taken by the service provider to restart their system, locate the 
source, and filter it. From our results, we got 84 normal 
messages. Further, was the unusually high, <) successful attacks 
that crashed the system. The reason for the crashes was due to 
the chance nature built within our code. These successful 
attacks are displayed by the groupings within figure 14. Of the 
attacks that got filtered, 7 attacks messages were discovered. 
V. CONCLUSION AN!) FUTURE WORK 
This paper builds upon our previous paper [36], in which 
identifies the real source of DDoS attacks. SOT A is a traceback 
system that is constructed on the basis of Web Services. Loose 
Coupling, Policy Based, Message Based and Dynamic 
discovery are some of criteria employed by the SOTA 
framework. The empirical data from ollr experiments :;hows that 
SOTA is efficient and effective. The experimental data also 
shows that SOT A is able to traceback to the source. Once an 
attack has been discovered and the attacker's identity known, 
counter measures can be initiated. The people, who will be 
interested in this research, are those that want to their protect 
web services in a cheap and efficient manner. In the future, we 
will build a filtering application and extelld SOTA to protect 
grid networks. 
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